This is a re-posted opinion piece.
On the surface, President Aquino’s recent visit to China seems to have yielded little by way of resolving the Spratly Island dispute. Despite earlier announcements that the President will use this occasion to raise the issue, this was glossed over on his return by emphasizing the visit as a success in terms of economic benefits. The visit was significant in that it actually took place despite the myriad of bilateral irritants including not just the Spratly Islands but also the aborted ZTE-NBN deal, the re-evaluation of the Northrail project and the botched Luneta hostage rescue, among others. It shows that China is prepared to give some slack to the country’s new Leader and whose mother still commands affection in the land of her ancestors. The President was wise to reprise the visit of his mother to their ancestral village in Fujian Province to burnish his own ancestral ties. This may stand him in good stead in future dealings with China.
But for now, the best that could be said of what was achieved in the scant minutes devoted to this topic between the two leaders is that both sides agreed to disagree but that there was room for peaceful resolution. Anybody who expected more than this probably also believes in the tooth fairy and that Elvis Presley is alive and well.
There are those who would believe that taking a tough line and macho posturing is the way to deal with the dispute and they have exhorted the President to do so. They think that China would not have the stomach for violent confrontation particularly since it has too much at stake in developing its economy that it could not afford to pick a fight with neighbors – especially those with muscular friends standing behind them. To his credit, the President took a more tactful approach that belies his earlier statements, which now to me may have been more intended for domestic consumption rather than a shot across the bow of China.
Readers of this column know that I have been advocating the need for dialogue. I am not even advocating official Track I dialogue but unofficial Track II dialogue, which involves opinion makers, which could be academics, media or officials in their personal capacity, talking shop. I have been told point blank that dialogue is of no use and smacks of appeasement. That we should simply stand up and do what we need to do to exercise our sovereignty over what is ours – even if others have similar claims.
Eschewing dialogue in favor of confrontation to me would be a serious miscalculation of Chinese resolve and a failure to appreciate the internal dynamics at play here. In an earlier column on this subject, I said that efforts at resolving the dispute would be better served if each claimant understands the economic, strategic and political interests that underlie each other’s claims. Only then can we find the common ground that can be the starting point for a resolution that allows each claimant to walk away from the negotiating table with something tangible.
China’s assertiveness
China’s newfound assertiveness also has its roots in these three dimensions of national interest. The economic dimension has to do with China’s unhampered access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans that ships coming from or bound for Chinese ports must traverse to reach its major markets and sources of raw materials. Initial seismographic data also suggests that vast deposits of gas and oil may lie underneath this vast track of sea. The International Energy Agency reported that China’s oil imports will grow from 1.5 million barrels per day (BPD) in 2000 to a staggering 10.9 million BPD by 2030. At this point, approximately 77 percent of China’s crude oil will be imported. Securing supplies of oil and natural gas and mineral resources are extremely important if China is to continue its rapid economic growth.
The strategic aspect is primarily in support of the aforementioned economic dimension. Increasingly also, as it grows into a world power, China feels it can live up to that billing if it is able to project this power to distant shores. It feels its ability to exert influence on world events that impact its national interest can be enhanced with this capability. It sees the risk of being bottled up in its home waters if the South China Sea is controlled by rival powers – like the US and Japan.
This is hard edged realpolitik but one that can be achieved by calculated combination of hard and soft power projection and diplomacy – more in keeping with China’s “peaceful rise” policy in the late ‘90s. Nationalism, however which drives politics in today’s China, is the wild card. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and now Princeton Professor Thomas Christensen contends that “since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even more Chinese.” This means that in present day China where communism is not as doctrinaire as before, having nationalist credentials confers political legitimacy. There can be no mistaking the fact that the Chinese public supports such assertiveness and show of might by its leadership now that they see their country as a world power. They are constantly reminded of China’s humiliation in the past at the hands of foreign powers. This can inhibit the taking of a sensible course of international relations in favor of something more popular domestically. The result has been for China to become more touchy and truculent towards what it feels as slights and provocations.
There is immediacy to this development. China is going to begin next year the process of transferring power from current President Hu Jin Tao to his anointed successor that is widely believed to be Xi Jinping, member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission. Hu’s successor must prove himself acceptable to the Party, the military and the general public. That means being seen as a protector of national pride by the public and a force for stability by the Party and the military. Showing partiality towards giving territorial concessions will not endear him to these power centers.
Even Taiwan is following the script of what in the West is called the “silly season” of election campaigning. President Ma Ying-jeu who is facing tough challenge in the January 2012 elections is reported to be planning a visit to Itu Abu, one of the islands occupied by Taiwan. This act, though internationally provocative, could translate into crucial votes among ardent nationalists.
So for those who think that China will simply stand idly by if other claimants show the same assertiveness – such as increasing their civilian and military presence or giving out oil concessions in disputed areas – they are dangerously naïve. When push comes to shove, China’s actions will be guided more by its internal dynamics. Prudent and rational foreign policies – as characterized by “peaceful rising” – cannot always be expected.
I am not saying that dialogue will resolve the issues. For the same reason, putting utmost faith that dialogue will resolve the dispute any time soon is also quite unrealistic and raises expectations which could also be downright dangerous. But as long as disputants are talking, there is less likelihood for miscommunications and then to violent escalation.
In classic diplomacy, negotiation and dialogue are at the core of the prudent management of international relations. Unfortunately, they do not work all the time. Track I diplomacy is constrained by realpolitik. In this instance, domestic concerns are as much a factor as maintaining good international relations. Sometimes they may be at cross-purposes. Negotiators must stand by their government’s publicly stated positions. This is why the process of putting flesh to the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China has taken on glacial speed. Negotiations have not yet reached a point where there is a will to find common grounds and interest from which to begin the process of a resolution.
Forum on South China Sea
Non-official‚ Track II diplomacy, on the other hand offers the opportunity to raise ideas and solutions that might not be possible in formal negotiations presently, but that could over time in?uence official thinking and, ultimately, policy. What seems infeasible today may, through unofficial contacts between thought leaders, obtain legitimacy tomorrow. Such concepts as joint guarantees of freedom of navigation, joint exploitation of resources, joint policing and patrols and environmental protection or even a “zone of peace and prosperity” may seem far-fetched today but given time and circumstances, to sink in, may offer win-win solutions for all claimants.
The Carlos P. Romulo Foundation is organizing jointly with Singapore’s Institute for Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) such an event which will be held on October 17 in Manila. Thought leaders from the region have been invited to participate in this rare event.
“Let’s give peace a chance” as John Lennon sang.
==============================================================================
By: Roberto R. Romulo
Source: The Philippine Star, Sept. 16, 2011
To view the original article, click here.
Comment here